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Abstract
As one of the most popular and influential legal ideologies since its inception in the late
1950s and early 1960s, there is a vast wealth of law and economics scholarship with
remarkable breadth encompassing nearly every area of law. Yet despite the abundance of
scholarship examining legal issues through a law and economics lens, there is
comparatively little literature explaining law and economics itself. This paper seeks to
overcome this gap in the literature by more clearly explaining the economic concepts on
which the theory is built and the connections between these concepts. In other words, this
paper aims to provide a clear, cohesive and complete overview of law and economics
such that readers will be able to understand how these economic concepts relate to each
other and the study of law.
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1.1. Introduction
As one of the most popular and influential legal ideologies since its inception in the late
1950s and early 1960s,1 there is a vast wealth of law and economics scholarship with
remarkable breadth encompassing nearly every area of law.2 Yet despite the abundance of
scholarship examining legal issues through a law and economics lens, there is
comparatively little literature explaining law and economics itself. At present, most of
this expository literature is encapsulated in a handful of popular introductory texts aimed
at law students and undergraduate economics students.3 On the whole, this work tends to
be more practice-oriented than theoretical in that little space is devoted to explaining the
theory with the bulk of the analysis instead being devoted to the application of economic
principles in legal cases. These introductions focus on how to conduct an economic
analysis of cases while largely skimming over theoretical components.
This paper seeks to overcome this gap in the literature by more clearly explaining
the economic concepts on which the theory is built and the connections between these
concepts. Drawing upon the scholarship explaining law and economics, this paper
See e.g. William M Landes, “The Empirical Side of Law & Economics”(2003) 70:1 U Chicago
L Rev 167 at 167 (“economic analysis of law is widely considered the most important
development in legal thought in the last fifty years”). See also Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen,
Law and Economics, 6th ed (Boston: Addison-Welsley/Prentice Hall, 2012) at 2 stating that law
and economics has been viewed as “the most important development in legal scholarship of the
twentieth century”. For a Canadian context, see Michael Trebilcock, “The Prospects of ‘Law and
Economics’: A Canadian Perspective” (1983) 33:2 J Leg Ed 288.
1

See e.g. Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 9th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law
& Business, 2014) at 4 and Richard A Posner, “The Law and Economics Movement” (1987) 77:2
The American Economic Review 1 at 1.
2

Many of these books explicitly acknowledge that students are their target audience. See e.g.
Daniel H Cole & Peter Z Grossman, Principles of Law and Economics, 2nd ed (New York:
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2011) at xix and David D Friedman, Law’s Order: What
Economics Has To Do With Law and Why It Matters (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2000) at 5-6.
3
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synthesizes the existing literature into a coherent theoretical account of law and
economics. In this sense, it will build upon the prior scholarship’s discussions of key
economic concepts and seminal writings in order to provide a summary of the theory. The
goal is to create a more integrated approach blending the varying strands throughout
current explanations into a new unified whole. In other words, this paper aims to provide
a clear, cohesive and complete overview of law and economics. The goal is that readers
will be able to understand how these economic concepts relate to each other and the study
of law.

1.2. How Law and Economics Is Explained
Typically, the existing literature explaining law and economics begins with an
introductory chapter or two summarizing microeconomics. Unfortunately, these
economic concepts are often presented and discussed entirely in the abstract with no
readily apparent relevance to law. Hence, the literature reads as if it were an introductory
microeconomics text rather than a legal theory. Although these scholars discuss how
economics applies to law, they typically do so in later sections divorced from their
summaries of microeconomics.4 This isolated approach to explaining economics is
problematic for law and economics both on persuasive and theoretical levels. By not
clearly explaining economics’ relevance to law from the outset, the scholarship is
inadvertently giving skeptical readers license to dismiss the theory as irrelevant and
uninteresting. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that many lawyers and law students
come from humanities or arts focused backgrounds so that the very mathematical and
See e.g. Ulen & Cooter, supra note 1 at 11-51 and Nicholas Mercuro & Steven G Medema,
Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond, 2nd ed (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006) at 20-25.
4

3
technical nature of microeconomics can be especially off-putting.5 Consequently, it is
preferable to build on the approach taken by some law and economics scholars who
interject their discussion of economic theory with specific legal examples6 as this would
help maintain reader interest amongst the legal profession while simultaneously
bolstering the theory. On a theoretical level, law and economics needs to be able to
cogently explain economics’ relevancy to law in order to ensure that economics is an
appropriate evaluative criteria for legal rules. Without this clear explanation, the whole
project of law and economics is questionable. Going forward, it would be best if
economics was clearly tied to its legal applications from the beginning.
Similarly, although the existing literature rightly identifies foundational texts and
core ideas within law and economics, regrettably these are often treated as unconnected
standalone concepts. Typically, these ideas are presented as a seemingly disparate list
without explicitly explaining how they are related and connected to each other.7
Consequently, concepts such as the Coase Theorem, risk aversion and rational choice
theory are often listed without demonstrating how they are tied together. While the
description of each individual idea may be clear, this atomized approach again hurts the
theory on both persuasive and theoretical levels. On a persuasive level, this tendency in
the scholarship may mean that economic concepts inadvertently come across as unrelated

In keeping with some prominent law and economics texts, this paper will not rely on
mathematics in the interest of furthering accessibility and comprehension. See e.g. Mitchell A
Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics, 4th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law &
Business, 2011).
5

See e.g. Alan James Devlin, Fundamental Principles of Law and Economics (Abingdon, Oxon:
Rutledge, 2015) at 20-23 (illustrating how criminal law may be viewed as an application of
microeconomics after introducing these concepts).
6

7

See e.g. ibid at ch 2.
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to each other. Thus, law and economics might appear unattractive because it seemingly
lacks cohesion. Likewise, on a theoretical level, this unconnected approach may give the
mistaken impression that law and economics is not theoretically sound because it appears
as a loose collection of ideas rather than stemming from first principles. This paper hopes
to overcome any possible misconceptions in earlier scholarship by being explicit about
the connections within law and economics. In particular, it aims to establish how rational
choice theory is the critical assumption underlying an economic analysis.
This functional approach dominating current explanations of law and economics
leads to many examples of an economic analysis in a variety of areas. The scholars tend
to provide a series of papers which show how an economic approach may be used in a
wide array of different areas of law including property, contract, tort, crime, family and
antitrust.8 Within each paper, scholars usually look at specific legal doctrines such as
negligence or limited liability and show either how they reflect fundamental economic
concepts described earlier or how these concepts could be used to properly interpret the
doctrine. In this sense, the scholarship promotes the feeling of a loose science in which
readers will be able to grasp economic thinking and its application to the law without
necessarily understanding the principles underlying this ideological approach. The goal of
these texts is to leave readers with the same useable method to employ in all sorts of
different legal scenarios.
Although having many practical examples is helpful to understanding law and
economics, the explanation of the application of economic concepts to law within these
examples is sometimes vague and unclear. For example, some of the more popular law

8

See generally e.g. Posner, supra note 2.
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and economics texts are written in a more conversational style in which they go back and
forth between different economic concepts interchangeably.9 While this approach makes
law and economics more accessible, it can lead to a looseness with the material. The
literature often aims for readers to “get the gist of it” and proceed with a basic
understanding rather than a full-fledged account from philosophical first principles. At
other points, the texts may ask the reader to determine on his or her own how the
economic approach is being used and why without ever providing an explicit answer.10
Admittedly, this is a common approach to writing texts for law students generally, not
restricted to law and economics. However, in part, this also reflects a tendency to treat
law and economics as self-evident. In these circumstances, the law and economics
understanding is somewhat guesswork by the reader based on the ability to piece together
earlier parts of the literature.
In general, the literature does not explicitly acknowledge the assumptions
underlying the field. For the most part, it proceeds by discussing economic ideas in
which their significance is taken as a given, unstated or implicit. Little space is devoted to
a normative justification of law and economics, opting instead to proceed with a largely
unstated assumed position that the theory is beneficial and worthwhile. Although some
scholarship has identified the philosophical premises underpinning the theory, this usually
only occurs in the criticism on law and economics which seeks to reject it.11 The majority
9

See generally ibid.

10

See generally ibid.

For a strong discussion of philosophical assumptions taking a critical approach to law and
economics see Jules L Coleman, “Economics and the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations
of the Economic Approach” (1984) 94:4 Ethics 649. Occasionally some proponents of law and
economics explicitly discuss these assumptions. See e.g. Robert D Cooter, “The Best Right Laws:
Value Foundations of the Economic Analysis of Law” (1989) 64 Notre Dame L Rev 817.
11
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of law and economics literature does not concern itself with philosophical defences but
rather wants to jump ahead to the real world application of law and economics in real
cases. In fairness, this paper acknowledges that the practical reality that these texts can
only devote so much space to any given topic particularly when the aim is to provide a
broad overview. Still, this paper asserts that more pages should be devoted to these
normative questions because they are crucial to readers’ adoption of law and economics.

1.3. A Better Explanation of Law and Economics
This paper argues that the existing explanation of law and economics, while
commendable for its strong real world application, should be revamped for persuasive
and theoretical reasons. By providing a clearer and more complete account of law and
economics, more people will adopt an economic analysis as their preferred method of
legal perspective. More fundamentally, in the process of reviewing limitations in how law
and economics is currently explained, the understanding of law and economics will be
substantiated. Thus, this paper proceeds with both practical and theoretical objectives. It
hopes to persuade others that law and economics is a worthwhile approach while
simultaneously strengthening law and economics itself.
The paper outlines law and economics as a legal theory which utilizes economics
to understand legal issues and cases. Under law and economics, law becomes the domain
of the economist rather than the lawyer as legal problems are recast as economic
problems to be understood and resolved through economic reasoning. Consequently, the
paper more clearly explains the two implicit halves of economics under law and
economics then is currently described in the existing literature. First, the paper overcomes
the descriptive gap in the literature by synthesizing rational choice theory which is the

7
bedrock principle of law and economics. The critical assumption underlying economics is
that people behave according to a rational choice model, meaning they aim to best satisfy
their preferences given their constraints. Second, the paper discusses the other meaning of
economics, the study of the allocation of scarce resources amongst competing uses in
society. Economics describes the theoretical construct of perfectly competitive markets in
which scarce resources are allocated to firms who then produce goods and services to
meet consumer demand.
Building upon rational choice theory and the market, these concepts extended as
the guiding framework for law as legal decisions are either analogized or considered
identical to market decisions. The paper then describes how the market is used to
understand law from both a top-down perspective focused on how lawmakers and the
legal system apply legal rules and a ground-up perspective focused on how citizens
choose to comply with or violate law. Law resolves conflicts over scarce resources by
“mimicking the market”. In other words, law facilitates the use of competitive markets by
lowering transaction costs which would otherwise prevent people from making mutually
beneficial bargains. Law and economics therefore reimagines legal rules as setting the
rights and entitlements which determine a series of conflicts regarding the allocation of
scarce resources.12 Law is about restoring the economic and personal freedom that would
have occurred if the conditions of perfect competition were met in actuality.
Finally, the paper concludes by explaining how law and economics accordingly
evaluates legal rules under the economic principle of efficiency as a proxy for how well
the market is functioning. While there are different definitions of efficiency, this paper
Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral” (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089 at 1090.
12
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adopts the Chicago school, or mainstream approach, of law and economics,13 which holds
that individuals are rational self-maximizers of their own preferences and that the law
both has been and ought to be interpreted with the principle of wealth maximization. In
simple terms, legal rules which maximize wealth across society are desirable and those
which reduce wealth are rejected. This approach requires judges to make decisions based
on the aggregate social benefits minus the aggregate social costs to arrive at the greatest
net benefit. Ideally, legal decisions will be made such that marginal social benefit equals
marginal social cost meaning that no additional change could be made that would
increase social welfare. These principles that legal rules both are and should be wealth
maximizing are known respectively as the positive and normative claims in law and
economics.

1.4. Limitations
At the same time, this paper is subject to certain restrictions which must be
acknowledged and addressed. Although it aims to provide a summary of the theory of law
and economics, there will necessarily be limitations in the extent to which certain aspects
of the theory may be explored.14 Law and economics is such a rich and sophisticated field
that it is too complex to fully describe within the scope of a single paper. To the extent

While there are numerous schools of law and economics, the Chicago school is recognized as
“mainstream law and economics”. See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 94 and Thomas J
Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law, 2nd ed (Stanford: Stanford Economics and Finance,
2009) at xxii. Similarly, most of the major texts in law and economics synthesized in this paper
are written from the Chicago school perspective. See Mercuro & Medema supra note 4 at 94. For
more on alternative schools in law and economics, see ibid and Ejan Mackaay, “0500 Schools:
General” in Gerrit de Geet, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed (Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar Publishers, 2000).
13

For example, detailed breakdowns of supply and demand matter for competition law which is
not discussed.
14
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that the paper is unable to fully discuss these areas, it refers readers to earlier scholarship
such as a history of law and economics,15 further detail on alternative schools of law and
economics16 and the encyclopedias of law and economics17 for a fuller account.
Admittedly, some may find the focus on the descriptive rather than normative
elements of law and economics strange. As a controversial theory often caricatured as
politically conservative, law and economics has long generated significant hostility and
skepticism among academics.18 However, some may think it is preferable to justify a
theory before explaining it, this approach does not work for law and economics. The
normative justification underlying law and economics cannot be understood without first
grasping how law and economics operates as a descriptive theory. This is because the
normative branch of law and economics derives exclusively from its positive branch.19
The positive branch of law and economics holds that existing law is efficient, meaning
that it seeks to minimize social costs in order to maximize net social benefit. Scholars
then expanded on this positive claim, known as the efficiency of the common law

See e.g. Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 1995) and Heath D Pearson, Origins of Law and Economics: The Economists’ New Science
of Law, 1830-1930 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
15

16

Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4.

Francesco Parisi, ed, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017) and Peter Newman, ed, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and
the Law, (London: Macmillan Reference, 1998).
17

Main criticisms include that law and economics relies on an unrealistic and inaccurate view of
rationality, that favouring efficiency over distribution skews an already unjust distribution, and
that the satisfaction of preferences is an inappropriate evaluative standard for law.
18

See similarly Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 129-30 discussing how differences between
the Chicago school’s positive and normative claims may be subtle.
19
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hypothesis, to argue that the law should be construed with efficiency as its central goal.20
In other words, the normative claim stems from the positive branch because it largely
replicates and supports the same efficiency based view of law.
Consequently, the paper accepts the normative justifications for law and
economics21 and proceeds from these assumptions in order to better focus on the unifying
strands connecting the theory as a whole. In particular, it accepts that under law and
economics that an unabashed defence of free markets is the best avenue for increasing
human welfare.22 Moreover, this paper accepts that the forward looking ex ante emphasis
of law and economics is particularly useful. As an empirical method rooted in rational
choice theory, law and economics provides an accurate predictive description of how
people respond to law in reality. It is a valuable theory because it identifies the incentives
created by law, thus guiding the formation of legal rules.

2.1. Economics in Law and Economics

Jon Hanson, Kathleen Hanson & Melissa Hart, “Law and Economics” in Dennis M Patterson
ed., A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, 2nd ed (Chichester, West Sussex, UK:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) at 300.
20

21 Admittedly,

these normative justifications are sometimes scant as economists are often
“indifferent, even condescending” towards philosophical questions. See Cooter, supra note 11 at
817.
This approach is justified with a pragmatic approach based in the strong empirical evidence
signifying that markets increase human welfare. See generally Richard A Posner, Overcoming
Law, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
22
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Law and economics is the application of economics, primarily microeconomics or price
theory, to understand and analyze legal rules and institutions.23 Although this definition is
circular, it reveals an important truth: the essence of law and economics is the use of an
outside academic discipline, economics, to gain further insight into the law.24 Simply put,
law and economics is a legal theory which utilizes economics to understand legal cases
and issues. As Friedman explains, law and economics “asserts that in order for legal
academics to fully understand what they are doing, they must first learn economics”.25
Under law and economics, the economist shows the lawyer how to properly analyze law.
This is because law and economics is an extension of economics in which economic ideas

See similarly “‘Law and Economics’ can be defined as the application of economic theory—
primarily microeconomics and the basic concepts of welfare to examine the formation, structure,
processes, and economic impact of law and legal institutions” Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4
at 1, Francesco Parisi, “Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and
Economics” (2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 259 at 259 and Lewis
Kornhauser, "The Economic Analysis of Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2017 Edition), Edward N Zalta ed, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/legaleconanalysis/>.
23

The use of another discipline is not unique to law and economics as this is common in any legal
theory influenced by legal realism including Marxist and feminist legal theory. See Mercuro &
Medema, supra note 4 at 19. See similarly, Richard A Posner, “The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline” (1987) 100:4 Harv L Rev 761. However, while law and economics is
often regarded as an offshoot of legal realism this is an overly simplistic view. Unlike legal
realism which held that all social sciences may further legal analysis, law and economics holds
economics as the sole social science to be applied to the study of law. Thus, the elevation and
focus on economics exclusively is a distinguishing characteristic of law and economics. See
generally Duxbury, supra note 15.
24

Friedman, supra note 3 at 12. See similarly Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at xix (“[t]o
understand the law, and how the legal system works, students must have a basic understanding of
economic principles”). Friedman further speculates that the theory’s insistence that economics is
essential to the understanding of law has contributed to some legal academics’ hostility towards
law and economics. See supra note 3 at 12.
25
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and concepts explain the formation and shape the interpretation of legal rules.26
Consequently, law and economics involves “learning to think like an economist”27
because it uses economic rather than “legal” reasoning to solve legal problems.28 Thus,
law and economics should be understood as economics applied to law rather than law
applied to economics.29 In particular, law and economics relies on neoclassical
microeconomics and welfare economics “where the operative organizing concepts are
Pareto efficiency in exchange, Pareto efficiency in production and Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency (i.e., wealth maximization)”.30 These terms will be explored more fully
throughout this paper.
While economics is often wrongly narrowly conceived as the study of money and
markets, in actuality it is a much broader discipline. The most commonly accepted
definition holds that “[e]conomics is the science which studies human behaviour as a

It is for this reason that virtually all early law and economics scholarship and a majority of the
most influential law and economics scholars were economists and not lawyers by trade. See Ejan
Mackaay, “0200 History of Law and Economics” in Gerrit de Geet, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics, 2nd ed (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2000) at 75 (noting that only a
few early law and economics scholars were lawyers).
26

27

See e.g. Polinsky, supra note 5 at xv.

28 Although

to some extent, law and economics suggests that there is no difference between legal
and economic reasoning because the theory maintains that legal reasoning is intuitively
economic.
Some scholars draw a distinction between the terms “law and economics” and “economic
analysis of law”. See e.g. Geoffrey P Miller, “Law and Economics Versus Economic Analysis of
Law” (2011) 11-16 NYU Law and Economics Research Paper. However, the majority use both
terms interchangeably most notably in Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law.
29

Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 20. Although microeconomics is a subset of economics,
the two terms will be used interchangeably throughout the paper as they are in the existing
literature.
30
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relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses”.31 Although this
definition is somewhat complex, it captures the essential premises of economics.
Economics is concerned with the problem of the necessity of choice under scarcity. Since
resources are scarce and have competing uses, there must be some way to allocate them.
Economics studies how people behave under the conditions of scarcity by assuming that
people act according to a rational choice model in which they try to maximize their
expected benefits subject to their expected costs. Hence law and economics may be
thought of as the implications of rational choice theory in a world in which resources are
scare in relation to human wants.32 Although law and economics maintains that
economics is the key discipline to understanding law, law and economics itself is
recognized as a distinct field from economics.33

2.2. Rational Choice Theory: The Heart of Law and
Economics
It is no understatement to say that law and economics is premised entirely on rational
choice theory. Law and economics can be considered “a systematic understanding of law

Baron Lionel C Robbins, An Essay On The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 3rd
ed (New York: New York University Press, 1984) at 15. Although there is no universally accepted
definition of economics, since most accept the definition offered by Robbins, it will likewise be
adopted in this paper. See Cole & Grossman, supra note 3 at 1, Ulen & Cooter, supra note 1 at
11-2 and Devlin, supra note 6 at 12.
31

32

See Posner, supra note 2 at 3.

For example, the Journal of Economics Literature formally recognized law and economics as a
separate field within economics. See Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 3. Moreover, law and
economics has been institutionalized within law schools rather than economics departments. See
ibid at 5.
33
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through a rational choice model”.34 Rationality is the “organising principle”35 of
economics and the “fundamental assumption on which the theory is built”.36 Law and
economics could not exist as a theory without the assumption of rationality.37 Moreover,
law and economics’ emphasis on rationality is one of its distinguishing features as it
places significantly greater weight on the view that people are rational actors than other
legal theories.38
Yet, despite its utmost significance, rational choice theory is seldom well defined
within law and economics literature. Instead, scholars rely on an implicit understanding
of rationality so that “there is rarely a discussion in the legal literature about what,
exactly, constitutes rational behavior”.39 Consequently, most current explanatory
approaches to rational choice theory are brief and largely assumed. Most texts provide a
one-sentence definition of rationality without much elaboration on the specific subcomponents of this definition. They largely treat this definition as self-evident and
proceed from this assumption. In part, this terse approach may reflect how most

34

Mackaay, supra note 26 at 68.

35

Devlin, supra note 6 at 13.

Friedman, supra note 3 at 17. See also Parisi, supra note 23 at 263 (“[t]his rationality
assumption provides the basic foundation for much law and economics literature”).
36

Herbert Hovenkamp, “Rationality in Law and Economics” (1992) 60 Geo Wash L Rev 293 at
293. See similarly Russell B Korobkin & Thomas S Ulen, “Law and Behavorial Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics” (2000) 88:4 Cal L Rev 1051 at
1060 and Thomas S Ulen, “0710 Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics” in Gerrit de
Geet, ed, Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2nd ed (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishers, 2000) at 791(both asserting that rational choice theory lies at the heart of modern
economics).
37

Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Cambridge: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2004) at 4.
38

39

Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37 at 1060.

15
economists consider their definition of rational choice “to be so obvious that they never
doubt it and are puzzled by those who do”.40 Although some texts offer a more detailed
explanation of rational choice theory, they typically do so in a piecemeal fashion in which
it is defined at various points throughout papers under different sub-headings rather than
being integrated in one coherent section.41 Neither approach is satisfactory given the
central importance of rationality within law and economics. Since rationality is the
lynchpin of law and economics, it is absolutely critical to understand the meaning of
rational choice theory in order to grasp the field as a whole. Otherwise, if readers reject
the rationality assumption presupposed by law and economics, they will, by extension,
reject every other claim within the theory.
To understand what rationality is within law and economics, it is helpful to first
consider what it is not. Rationality has a very precise and specific meaning within
economics which differs from more colloquial and informal meanings. For example,
many people use the terms “rational” and “irrational” in a moralistic sense to signify their
respective approval or disapproval of others’ behaviour. Thus, a person may be labelled
as “irrational” merely because someone disagrees with his or her decision.42 On the
contrary, law and economics is unapologetically agnostic on questions of morality.
Whether a person’s action could be considered moral or immoral has no bearing

40

Ulen, supra note 37 at 792.

See generally e.g. Devlin, supra note 6 for a scattered approach to discussing rationality across
numerous subsections.
41

See similarly Daniel M Hausman & Michael S McPherson, Economic Analysis, Moral
Philosophy and Public Policy, 2nd ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 50.
42
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whatsoever on whether that person is rational. Law and economics accepts that both
moral and immoral people are rational.43
Similarly, rationality is also commonly defined as deliberate and consistent
choice. Under this view, “the decision maker has thought about what he or she will do
and can give a reasoned justification for the choice”.44 Likewise, this definition expects
that these reasoned choices will be stable over time so that there are no wild swings in
behaviour.45 By contrast, rationality under law and economics need not be deliberate or
even conscious.46 There is no requirement that decision makers reflect and reason
carefully in order to be considered rational. The theory does not claim that people
explicitly and consciously weigh costs and benefits in order to calculate expected utility
when making decisions. Rather, it asserts that people behave “as if” they were making
these calculations when arriving at their choices.47 In this sense, rational selfmaximization is a largely an evolutionary subconscious process innate to all humans as a
part of ordinary life. Likewise, although there is some restriction that decisions be stable
across time, due to the conditions of transitivity and reflexivity, law and economics
accepts that there may be wild swings in behaviour as evidenced by the sunk cost

See Hausmann & McPherson, supra note 42 at 64 noting that “[o]ne can be a rational villain”.
See also Friedman, supra note 3 at 8 (discussing a rational burglar).
43

44

Ulen, supra note 37 at 791.

45

Ibid.

46

These claims will be further developed when discussing positive law and economics.
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fallacy.48 Neither of these common definitions of rationality accurately reflects the
meaning of rationality within law and economics.
Rationality, under law and economics, means that people are forward-looking so
that they make decisions anticipating the future with a view to maximizing their selfinterest or expected utility subject to constraints.49 Since this definition is complex,
consisting of many sub-components, it is helpful to adopt a conceptual framework in
order to contextualize these multiple aspects. Admittedly there is no universally accepted
definition of rational choice theory.50 However, Korobkin and Ulen argue that rationality
in law and economics exists along a “continuum” depending upon “how specific and
precise the predictions of the theory are”.51 They suggest that rationality ranges from
“thin” versions which are relatively undemanding to “thick” versions which offer more
vigorous predictions.52 This paper will elaborate on the thinner expected utility version
which is a precursor to the thick self-interest version, otherwise known as the dominant
theory of rationality within law and economics.

2.3. Rationality as Expected Utility
Expected utility theory is the most popular theory within microeconomics,53 and
accordingly the foundational theory of rationality within law and economics. It is a
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this section.
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behavorial theory designed to understand and predict how individuals make decisions.54
Expected utility holds that people perform an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis to
maximize their expected benefits and minimize their expected costs given their external
constraints.55 Although the term “utility” is used, expected utility theory is not to be
mistaken as utilitarianism.56 While early economic thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham and
Adam Smith may be considered precursors of law and economics scholars, these theories
are separate.57
Expected utility theory is a thin theory of rationality because it does not specify a
person’s goals or preferences.58 Instead, the theory “says nothing about what people
want”.59 It leaves open that an individual’s utility function could be conceivably almost
anything. Consequently, “utility” is defined quite broadly to include anything that
contributes to an individual’s satisfaction or happiness such as aesthetic tastes, altruism
and a desire for fairness.60 It is for this reason that expected utility theory does not imply
self-interest. Both a person who greatly valued the well-being of others and a person who
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did not care for others’ well-being are utility maximizers.61 Expected utility theory treats
individuals’ preferences determining their utility function as exogenous meaning that they
are derived from outside economics and institutions62 and hence outside utility
maximization.63 A person’s preferences are taken as a given.
Although expected utility theory says nothing about why people want what they
want, it does explain how people act based on what they want. In other words, it explains
how people choose to best satisfy their goals and preferences without explaining what led
them to have these goals and preferences in the first place.64 Expected utility theory
maintains that
decision makers conduct an explicit or implicit cost-benefit analysis of competing
options
and select the optimal method of achieving their goals (that is, the method
that maximizes
expected benefits and minimizes expected costs, or maximizes net
benefits), subject to
external constraints.65
Constraints refers to the real world limitations people face when making decisions such
as limited income, time, memory, calculating abilities or limited opportunities.66
Therefore, people seek the greatest benefit for the least cost.

2.4. Decisions Under Risk and Uncertainty
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Building upon the core concept of utility maximization, law and economics
acknowledges the practical reality that an individual’s rational self-maximization is
subject to risk and uncertainty. As there are no guarantees in life, most decisions are made
in the face of either of risk or uncertainty. Economics draws a distinction between these
two terms by maintaining that risk is calculable whereas uncertainty is not.67 Accordingly,
economics provides a series of tools for understanding this real world problem. Thus, the
term expected utility is used to signify the outcome an individual anticipates will happen.
Expected utility theory explains that an individual may be either risk-seeking,
risk-averse or risk-neutral. An individual’s appetite for risk affects his or her utility
maximization. A risk-seeking individual prefers riskier decisions, so that he or she would
prefer a smaller chance of a greater gain than a greater chance of a smaller gain. On the
contrary, a risk-adverse person prefers the opposite or “the safe bet” or “sure thing”. A
risk-neutral individual would be indifferent between the two. For example, given the
choice between a 10% chance of winning $1000 and a 100% chance of winning $100, a
risk-seeking individual would prefer the former, a risk-adverse individual the latter and a
risk-neutral individual would be indifferent.68 Note that mathematically these two
outcomes have the same expected value. It is an individual’s attitude toward risk that
shapes their desirability.
Uncertainty, like risk, acknowledges that many outcomes cannot be known in
advance. However, unlike risk, uncertainty is neither probabilistic nor calculable which
derails self-maximization calculations because an individual cannot properly weigh
Posner, supra note 2 at 4-5 explaining the distinction between risk and uncertainty under
economics.
67
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benefits and costs.69 Consequently, economics must explain how individuals make
decisions involving uncertainty. Expected utility theory states that individuals implicitly
weigh the probability of uncertain outcomes. Thus, people often estimate the likelihood
of different outcomes even when they cannot be precisely measured.70 These estimates
allow people to implicitly assign weight to various outcomes so that they can engage in a
cost-benefit analysis. Admittedly, this approach may raise complexities such as if the
estimates are arbitrary or inaccurate. However economics recognizes that people still act
rationally in the face of uncertainty because they taking their best bet despite not having
full information.71

2.5. Rationality as Self-Interest
The self-interest version of rational choice theory is the dominant approach within law
and economics.72 Building upon expected utility theory, the self-interest theory of
rationality likewise holds that individuals are rational self-maximizers. The difference
between the two is whereas the former is indifferent to what individuals prefer, the latter
assumes that people act to maximize their self-interest. Thus, the self-interest version has
been referred to as a thick version of rationality because it not only specifies how people
make decisions but also what their end goal or preferences are.73 In turn, this self-interest
assumption allows the theory to predict individuals’ behavior. For example, it is
Posner insists that uncertainty cannot be calculated although he does not explain why. See
Posner, supra note 2 at 4-5.
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commonly predicted in law and economics literature that a cap on or abolition of punitive
damages would lead to greater numbers of defective products. Although scholars making
this prediction do not say so, they are implicitly relying on the assumption that product
manufacturers are self-interested because they only care about their profit and will only
regard customer health and safety if that somehow affects their end product.74
Admittedly, the self-interest theory of rationality is somewhat unstable as there is
no consensus on its meaning within law and economics. There has been some suggestion
that self-interest should be defined quite narrowly so that a person only cares about the
effect of consequences on himself or herself. This view of self-interest holds that an
individual is only concerned for his or her own financial gain and well-being.75 However,
most prominent law and economics scholars adopt a broader definition, namely that selfinterest means anything that may contribute to an individual’s satisfaction or “ends in
life”.76 Moreover, they explicitly state that self-interest is not to be mistaken for
selfishness as it can include consideration for others.77 Thus, self-interest is compatible
with and may include altruism.78 However, some have suggested that the broader
definition may lead to unworkable predictions.79
This paper argues that the narrow versus broad self-interest debate is a false
dichotomy. In other words, both definitions are compelling because both contain some
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truth. Rather than taking an either/or approach in which only one definition may prevail,
this paper maintains that both definitions are partly correct because some people are
narrowly self-interested whereas others are broadly self-interested. However, ascertaining
whether the majority of people are narrowly or broadly self-interested is an empirical
question well beyond the scope of this paper.

3.1. Economics as the Allocation of Scarce Resources
In turn, this rational choice model of human behavior is extended to the principal area of
study within economics: the allocation of scarce resources through the market.
Admittedly, how the economic problem of the allocation of scarce resources relates to
law may be somewhat obscured in existing explanatory texts for three reasons. First, as
discussed previously, rationality is largely assumed within the literature. Although
rational choice theory explains why and how market actors, including individuals and
firms, seek to rationally self-maximize, this point is often implicit and taken as selfevident. The end result is that discussions regarding the market may inadvertently seem
disconnected from rational choice theory even though the former implicitly relies on the
latter. Second, existing texts are not uniform in their explanations of the market as they
start from different premises depending on the scholar. This varying approach makes
explanatory accounts seem somewhat inconsistent across texts. In particular, some texts
open their summaries of microeconomics by taking the existence of markets as a given
without explaining why they exist in the first place.80 Others try to answer this question
more definitively. Third, as alluded to earlier, stylistically these texts tend to not explicitly
demonstrate how the economic idea of the market relates to law. Rather, the tendency is
80
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to simply provide a summary of microeconomics largely separate from law. Although this
paper will adopt a similar approach in that it will first outline the standard orthodox view
of markets under economics before discussing its legal application, this paper hopes to
bridge the connection between economics and law. Therefore, it will begin by explaining
economics and then outline how these economic concepts impact the analysis of law.
Again, it is essential to provide an overview of the market solution to the problem of
allocation of scarce resources because this is the guiding framework for law under law
and economics.

3.2. Scarcity
Economics begins with the observation that human beings live in a world of scarcity in
which there may be fewer resources available than people who desire them. Scarcity does
not mean that resources are physically scarce but rather that the supply of a desired good
is limited compared to the demand for it. For example, although E coli is physically
scarce, as there is only a finite amount of E coli in the world, it is not economically scarce
because people do not want this potentially fatal bacterium.81 Scarcity leads to conflicts
because there is a shortage of desired goods relative to people who want them. For
example, if there were only two people and only one apple in the world, which they were
unwilling to divide or share, they would be in conflict. In the language of economics, the
apple is a scarce resource because its demand exceeds its supply as two people desire or
demand the apple but there is a supply of only one available. Further assume that both
people desire the apple because they want to eat it. If one person eats the apple then the
other cannot and vice versa. Therefore, the apple has alternative or competing uses since
81
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the one use excludes the other. Scarcity then creates real world problems of justly
allocating resources.82 The dilemma of who gets what is a very tangible and ongoing
process.

3.3.The Market and Perfect Competition
Economics studies the process by which market forces allocate scarce resources by selfinterested firms producing or supplying goods to meet consumer demand who are
likewise acting in their own self-interest. Thus, developed countries allocate scarce
resources through market economies through property rights as the market solution is to
equate willingness and ability to pay with preferences which in turn serves as a rough
proxy for utility.83
The economy is understood through the intellectual construct known as perfect
competition. This theoretical market, being both purely competitive and functioning,
assumes:
(i) a large number of buyers motivated by self-interest and making the choices
they
expect will maximize their utility; (ii) many sellers, also motivated
by self-interest, and
acting to maximize their profits; (iii) individual
buyers and sellers are unable to exert any
control over the prices and
are thus price takers; (iv) prices serve as guideposts for
decisionmakers in the market to (among other things) communicate scarcity; (v)
products are standardized (i.e., homogenous); (vi) there are no barriers to entry or exit,
which means that consumers and producers are free to enter or leave all product
and
factor markets; (vii) all buyers and sellers are fully informed as to
the terms of all market
transactions; (viii) resources are held in
private property with all rights defined and
assigned; and (ix) prevailing
laws and property rights are fully enforced through the
state.84
Presumably, it is preferable to not allocate resources through dictatorship or arbitrary means
based on a desire for fairness. Though both are conceptually possible and unfortunately
sometimes acted upon.
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Perfect competition takes the expected utility and self-interested theory of rational choice
as the norm for firm and consumer behavior. It then adds to this theory a variety of
assumptions such as that all transactions are made freely and with full consent and
information. Importantly, perfect competition is an idealized construct meant to provide a
useful model for economists to make workable predictions about the economy. It is not
meant to provide an accurate depiction of the world as these conditions will rarely be met
in practice. Perfect competition explains how producers utilize privately owned scarce
resources to produce goods and services which meet the demands of consumers.85
The market necessitates that individuals make choices about what they desire
most and how much they are willing to pay to acquire it. Since people have restricted
time and income, they cannot chose to buy everything or have every experience that they
would like to have86 and accordingly must prioritize what they want most. Hence, the
“economic problem is the necessity of choice under scarcity”.87 Microeconomics offers a
theory, self-interested rationality, to explain how people make these decisions.88 In
economic terms, individuals choose the optimal bundle of goods and services that best
satisfies their preferences given their constraints.89 Individuals aim to self maximize
because rationality requires it.90 Hence, decisions are made at the margins in which
people consider the benefit and cost of the next unit of any given good. Thus, people will
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only purchase or sell one unit more if the benefit that they would receive would be larger
than the cost of purchasing or producing that unit.91
In practice, choices are costly because they require trade-offs in which any choice
includes not only its explicit monetary price but also its opportunity cost which is the cost
of foregoing alternatives.92 For example, if a person paid $25 to eat a pizza at a restaurant
then he or she would not only incur the monetary cost but also the opportunity cost of not
ordering steak instead. Hence, economists often remark “there is no such thing as a free
lunch”. Similarly, people face information costs also known as or the costly of acquiring
and comprehending information when making choices.

4.1. Incorporating Rationality and the Market: Old versus
New Law and Economics
These insights from economics that humans conform to a rational choice model and that
the market allocates scarce resources were initially modestly incorporated into law under
what has been dubbed “old law and economics”.93 Following the leadership of University
of Chicago law professor Aaron Director, who pioneered much of the economic analysis
of antitrust law, early law and economics was almost entirely focused on competition
matters. Although other areas of law were examined through an economic lens, such as
corporate law, tax law and patent law, the old school was restricted to explicit markets
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and obvious “economic areas”.94 In this sense, the economic analysis of law was initially
quite modest as it was limited to few areas.
In the 1960s and 1970s, law and economics crystallized into its modern form
under the “new school” as revolutionary papers by Ronald Coase, Henry Manne, Guido
Calabresi and Gary Becker expanded the economic analysis into core common law areas
such as tort and contract.95 These scholars understood economics as applicable to legal
rules in areas traditionally not considered to be relevant for market behaviour, thus
paving the way for economic analysis in virtually every aspect of law. Although these
seminal pieces of scholarship were foundational for law and economics, they were
somehow disjointed being focused on discrete areas of private and public law. It was not
until a decade later when Richard Posner made the first attempt to demonstrate law and
economics as an all encompassing theory throughout the entire common law in his
landmark Economic Analysis of Law.96 He largely repeated and summarized the findings
of these earlier scholars in order to demonstrate the implicit underlying economic logic in
all of law. Accordingly, although Posner did not originate all the ideas, in many respects
he perfected them, earning him the role of mainstream law and economics’ central
figure.97 Thus new law and economics holds that
the economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human
behavior,
be it behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow
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prices, repeated or infrequent
emotional or mechanical ends.98

decisions, large or minor decisions,

Under the new school of law and economics individuals are rational self-maximizers in
all areas of their life, no matter what the decision or context.99 This allows modern law
and economics its unwavering insistence that economics is applicable to all areas of law
rather than simply its obvious market areas such as competition and taxation, because
much of law deals with non market behaviour such as divorce and accidents.100

4.2. The Problem of Social Cost
The shift from old to new law and economics began with Ronald Coase. “The Problem of
Social Cost”101 is one of the most widely cited and discussed articles in legal academia. It
is the most cited article within law and economics102 and “the most famous example of
the economic analysis of law”.103 Yet despite its position as the foundational article of
modern law and economics, tying rational choice theory and microeconomics to private
law, it is commonly misunderstood and inaccurately summarized.104 In part, this approach
stems from George Stiglier’s somewhat ungenerous view of Coase’s article, coining the
term “Coase Theorem” and influencing subsequent scholarship.105 Consequently, much of
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the current understanding of “The Problem of Social Cost” has been simplistically
collapsed into the statement that absent transaction costs parties will negotiate to the
efficient outcome. While Coase’s article stands for this proposition, this is an overly
narrow summary of his work divorced from its original context and purpose. More
importantly, it fails to explain the utter centrality of “The Problem of Social Cost” within
law and economics as necessary to unpacking the theory’s central claims because the
Coase Theorem is a step to positive and normative law and economics.
Although “The Problem of Social Cost” has broad implications for the entirety of
law and economics, Coase wrote his article as a relatively focused and narrow response
to the prevailing view of the day, popularized by economist Pigou, that government
intervention was needed to correct market externalities. In the standard example of
externalities, a factory produces harmful smoke as part of its production process which in
turn pollutes a nearby residential area.106 Since preventing the pollution would create
additional production costs for the factory,107 it has no incentive to stop polluting. It
would be cheaper for the factory to pollute because that minimizes its costs.
Consequently, the residents suffer the negative externality of pollution. In this instance,
the private costs borne by the factory, namely the costs of its production process, diverge
from the social costs, the costs of pollution on the residents. Thus, there is a negative
externality, a form of market failure in which the actor does not experience the full costs
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of his or her behavior, in this case the pollution, because the cost is borne by another
party.108
At the time of Coase’s response, the then current understanding of negative
externalities dictated three possible responses of state intervention to correct this market
failure.109 First, a Pigouvian tax could be levelled against the business for the amount of
pollution. This tax should be priced at the same amount as the pollution thereby forcing
the factory to internalize the costs of its production, correcting the negative externality.
Second, the factory could be liable for the damages it caused, triggering the same process
of internalizing the externality. Third, most invasively, the factory could be excluded
from residential districts. In any event, Coase challenged all three options maintaining
they were “inappropriate in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even
usually, desirable”.110
Coase flipped the prevailing understanding of externalities on its head, exposing
the myth of presupposed mandatory state intervention. He began by carefully observing
that contrary to the popular notion of externalities, which saw harm as a one-way
monocausal relationship, this view mistakenly ignored the inherent reciprocal nature
between the parties. It is not the case that the business in question is always the harm
causer bearing full responsibility for the negative externality. Rather, Coase asserted, both
parties negatively injure each other because externalities cannot exist without the
presence of another. For example, if the factory had been polluting in an industrial area
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with no neighbouring homes then there would not be a negative externality. It is only
because some people chose to live next to the factory that harm occurred. Both parties are
harmed by each other’s presence because they have competing uses of the same space.
Given then that externalities rely on an inherently reciprocal nature, the question is not
which form of state intervention should be used to punish the business but rather which
party should be allowed to inflict harm on the other.111
Coase illustrated the reciprocal nature of harm by using the economics model of
perfect competition to demonstrate that parties can resolve tort disputes by negotiating to
the efficient outcome, thereby eliminating any need for government intervention, through
his now famous Coase Theorem hypothetical. Although the facts can be and have been
explored in a variety of contexts,112 in his original hypothetical Coase imagined a conflict
involving a rancher whose cows wander into a neighbouring farmer’s land, destroying
some of the latter’s crop.113 He argued that absent transaction costs, the farmer and
rancher would negotiate to the efficient outcome regardless of who held the initial
property right. Therefore, regardless if the farmer had a legal right to not have the cows
on his or her land or if the rancher had a legal right to allow his or her cattle to roam,
either way the parties would negotiate to the exact same social outcome in a world of
zero transaction costs.
Coase then demonstrated the theorem through a series of older common law tort
cases where he showed that they all conformed to the same efficiency based logic. He
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argued these judges were implicitly drawing upon economic principles in their decisions.
He maintained that although these judges did not invoke economic language, there
nonetheless was “some recognition, perhaps largely unconscious and certainly not very
explicit, of the economic aspects of the questions at issue”.114 Therefore, under Coase’s
view, economic reasoning in judicial decisions was largely intuitive and inherent.
Posner expanded upon Coase’s foundational work by moving from the very
specific tort examples outlined in “The Problem of Social Costs” into all areas of law
generally. Not only would law generate efficient outcomes in the relatively contained
examples discussed by Coase, but this efficiency hypothesis would explain the
significantly broader entire body of common law doctrine. Thus, Posner maintained that
transaction costs underlined both the positive and normative branches of law and
economics, as existing legal doctrine is understood as the common law’s effort to reduce
transaction costs and that normatively the best legal decisions reduction transactions
costs.115

4.3. The Market Applied to Law: Law As Prices and Law As
Entitlements
Drawing largely from the work of Coase and Posner, the crucial innovation of law and
economics was to take the market, a theoretical construct designed to explain the flow of
scarce resources from rational profit maximizing firms to rational utility maximizing
consumers, as a framework for understanding legal decisions from both the perspective
of lawmakers and law abiders or breakers. No longer were markets limited to explicit
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markets such as the stock trade, as now any legal decision can be analyzed under the
“legal market”. Economics can explain the behaviour of those those who enforce the law
and those who obey or violate the law. Consequently, two approaches emerged the
entitlement approach focused on lawmakers and the legal system which analogizes legal
rules are setting the entitlements for scarce resources and the price theory approach which
analogizes laws as setting prices for behavior implicitly shaping people’s decisions to
comply with or violate law. Although both views, co-exist throughout the scholarship,
unfortunately most explanatory literature tends to be rooted in only one of these two
approaches. In particular, many texts tend to only focus on the price theory view.
Unfortunately, this emphasis on price theory creates inconsistency across texts and offers
a somewhat myopic impression of law and economics. The better approach would be to
explicitly set out that law and economics contains both a top-down approach focused on
lawmakers, the entitlement view, and a ground-up approach focused on citizens, the price
theory view.

4.4. Legal Rules As Prices
The rational choice model underscoring economics allows law and economics to
accurately predict the real world effect of legal rules on people’s behaviour.116 This is
because under rational choice theory “all relevant assumptions about individuals’ desires,
their knowledge, their capabilities, and the environment will have been made explicit”.117
The predictive mode is both empirical and practical, focusing on answering how changes
E.g. Shavell, supra note 38 at 1 and Friedman, supra note 3 at 9. This predictive mode is
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in law will alter behaviour. It aims to determine what effect a law will have by setting out
a hypothesis to be tested against actual real world conditions. Thus, the price theory style
of law and economics has a nearly endless array of questions to investigate such as
whether increasing the length of imprisonment for murder will increase or decrease the
murder rate or if punitive damages for products liability will encourage manufacturers to
take greater care.118 In this sense, this branch of law and economics is externally focused,
concerned with how citizens interact with law and the legal system.
Closely tied to the predictive view lies the strong emphasis on ex ante, as opposed
to ex post, reasoning within law and economics. Unlike the majority of legal theories
which concentrate on ex post reasoning, accepting that the relevant harm occurred and
accordingly only aiming to apportion the responsibility and cost of that harm, law and
economics has broader goals. It seeks not only to address the parties in the particular case
before it, but also to create incentives for similarly situated parties in the future.119 Thus,
“[l]egal rules are to be judged by the structure of incentives they establish and the
consequences of people altering their behaviour in response to those incentives”.120 Law
and economics has the benefit of maintaining the traditional goal of apportioning costs
within any given legal case as well as positively impacting potential future cases.
The predictive view frames itself as value neutral, ostensibly illuminating the
consequences of legal rules without guiding which legal rule is best. For instance,
although law and economics can predict whether an increase in the penalty for speeding
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will lead to a decrease in this behaviour, it cannot dictate whether this is a sensible
change. However laudable the goal of a value neutral theory may be, critics argue that
applying economics to law “shapes thought and language by determining what we look at
and what we see”.121 Their argument is that law and economics, by highlighting attention
to efficiency concerns, determines the scope of debate for legal change and subsequently
implicitly informs the choice of legal rule. On the contrary, law and economics scholars
assert that mere prediction of what effect a particular legal rule will have does not denote
any particular conclusion.122 Regardless of how neutral the predictive mode is in practice,
nearly everyone agrees that analyzing what effects law will have is valuable especially as
it may ultimately help determine which rule is preferable.123
Moreover, law and economics expands upon this function to argue that law and
economics predicts the real world effect of legal rules which, by extension, may shape
behaviour in a socially desirable direction.

4.5. Legal Rules As Entitlements
Utilizing economics, the study of the allocation of scarce resources, law and economics
conceives of law as a battleground for allocation. Under a legal framework, the allocation
of scarce resources refers not to the physical resource itself but rather the right or
entitlement to that scarce resource.124 This may be thought of as the “right to perform
certain actions”.125 Since in most situations transaction costs are prohibitively high, such
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that parties will not be able to negotiate to the efficient outcome, there must be an
objective criteria that will allow lawmakers to assign entitlements. Thus, the law should
allocate scarce resources by “mimicking the market” so that entitlements are assigned to
the most efficient user, replicating what would have happened in a perfectly functioning
market.126 In practice, courts are expected to either lower transaction costs facilitating
competitive markets and allowing for mutually beneficial exchanges or, if transaction
costs are prohibitively high, price transactions at the rate that they would have been if the
parties had been able to bargain. Law and economics justifies this approach through its
use of the market as a guiding analogy for legal decisions.

5.1. The Benchmark for Law and Economics: Efficiency
Under economics, efficiency is the standard used to assess how well the market is
functioning. It is used to judge the total costs and benefits stemming from the allocation
of entitlements to scarce resources based on individual preferences. Efficiency therefore
is the “proxy for social welfare; the more efficient a given allocation, the greater welfare
benefits for society”.127 In turn, efficiency is also the normative hallmark for the
evaluation of legal rules under law and economics. Put simply, a legal rule or decision is
good if it increases efficiency and bad if it does not.
Unfortunately, efficiency is often defined and weighed differently as well as is
misunderstood in the scholarship.128 Although different versions of efficiency co-exist
within law and economics, at its heart efficiency reflects the extent to which law
126
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facilitates people’s ability to satisfy their preferences; the more efficient an outcome is,
the better it satisfies these preferences. Typically, both economics and law and economics
begin with the concept of Pareto efficiency or a Pareto improvement in which at least one
person is made better off and no one else is made worse off as the result of a voluntary
transaction.129 Since neoclassical economics judges efficiency by the extent to which
people’s preferences are satisfied, individuals are made “better off” under Pareto
efficiency because they judge their own preferences to be more fulfilled.130 Exchanges
under Pareto efficiency affect the allocation of scarce resources by placing them in the
hands of those who desire them most. Consequently, Pareto efficiency is a measure of
allocative efficiency which refers to “the distribution of goods and services in the
economy to maximize social welfare”.131 It is an attractive standard, being strongly
grounded in consent as only voluntary exchanges are possible and any exchange which
will make at least one person worse off is prevented.132
Despite its appeal, in reality few transactions will ever be Pareto efficient as, by
definition, it only applies to contracts without negative externalities.133 Consequently, it is
extremely difficult if not impossible to adopt Pareto criteria as a legal standard as the
majority of legal rules produce losers. In other words, it is impossible to interpret a legal
rule without making at least one party worse off.134 Consequently, Pareto efficiency exists
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more as an ideal rather than a practical measure. Moreover, even if possible, it suffers
from two principal theoretical limitations. First, since it takes initial distributions as a
given and only judges whether subsequent exchanges are efficient,135 Pareto efficiency
does nothing to correct situations where an initial distribution of goods and services is
unjust. Second, similarly, it does not lead to a unique allocation but rather a multitude of
different allocations. Since there are many possible allocations, these are non comparable
because they all make at least one person better off. Consequently, a main criticism of
efficiency based standards is that there is no way of ranking them.136
The difficulty in actualizing Pareto efficiency has led to the much more
controversial Kaldor-Hicks efficiency or wealth maximization as the efficiency norm in
law and economics. Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a legal decision is considered
efficient provided that the winners could theoretically compensate the losers and still
experience a net gain. However, actual compensation need not take place.137

5.2. A Positive and Normative Theory
Law and economics is both a positive and a normative theory of law. Positive law and
economics is internally focused and descriptive, being concerned with the internal
consistency of legal rules.138 Positive law and economics asserts that law, particularly
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common law doctrine, has been developed in accordance with the principle of efficiency
such that existing legal rules are wealth maximizing.139 This claim, known as the
“efficiency of the common law hypothesis”,140 is most closely associated with Posner
whose thesis held that common law doctrine developed according to an underlying
economic efficiency in order to avoid waste and maximize societal wealth.141 In his
landmark Economic Analysis of Law, Posner demonstrates how each common law
doctrine may be conceptualized as an attempt to lower transaction costs and maximize
wealth. In turn, this set up a research agenda for scholars to use concepts from
neoclassical economics to determine which rules are efficient and show that the common
law did in fact operate according to this principle.142Although the efficiency of the
common law hypothesis has provoked significant debate and criticism testing its validity,
this debate is outside the scope of this paper. Consequently, the efficiency of the common
law hypothesis will be largely assumed notwithstanding literature contesting this claim.
As a continuation of positive law and economics, normative law and economics
extends and justifies the efficiency of the common law claim as the preferable style of
legal rules. Not only has law been developed in accordance with wealth maximization, as
revealed by the descriptive branch, but additionally law should maximize wealth across
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society. Admittedly, wealth maximization as a normative principle, has been extremely
controversial both within and especially outside law and economics. There is no
uniformity or consensus between law and economics scholars on whether efficiency
should be the goal of law and how law should be reformed to best achieve efficiency.143
Although, wealth maximization has triggered significant hostility outside law and
economics,144 these objections are outside the scope of the paper and it accepts wealth
maximization as this is normative law and economics under the mainstream view.
In turn, the positive and normative branches of law and economics center on three
main areas. As Friedman explains, law and economics is principally concerned with three
distinct areas of “predicting what effect particular legal rules will have, explaining why
particular legal rules exist, [and] deciding what legal rules should exist”.145 In other
words, law and economics has a descriptive function aimed at understanding why law has
unfolded in the particular way that it has, a predictive function aimed at identifying what
effect law will have and a normative function aimed at choosing what the best laws are. It
seeks to understand why past law has developed, while also looking to see how law
should be shaped in the future.

It is for this reason that “normative law and economics” may also be seen as an invitation to
decide what normative basis law should be decided upon. This paper is only using the term
normative law and economics to denote the mainstream Chicago view. See Hanson, Hanson &
Hart, supra note 20 at 300 and Mercuro & Medema, supra note 4 at 48-50.
143
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6.1 Conclusion
This paper has synthesized the major literature explaining law and economics in the
hopes of providing a more coherent and complete account of the theory. It has described
how law and economics rests on a rational choice theory which is the basis for explaining
the allocation of scarce resources through the market. In turn, the concept of the market is
analogized to all legal decisions providing an efficiency based view of law. This requires
lawmakers to either lower transaction costs such that parties can either negotiate to
efficient outcomes themselves or price transactions in such a way that the parties would
have if there had been no transaction costs.
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